
… It knows no peacetime.” So gasped the French writer the Marquis de Custine after spending three months of 1839 in Russia. At the time Russia was in the middle of the Caucasian War (1817-1864) and also trying to conquer Central Asian khanates.
Custine’s subsequent book is a miracle of insight, especially considering that he embarked on his journey without much knowledge of the country. Most educated Russians I know have read La Russie en 1839, and I have yet to meet one who thought that Custine’s observations and inferences were anything other than astonishingly accurate.
Russian studies haven’t been blessed by many equally astute commentators since then. In fact, academics, historians, economic analysts and even intelligence officers have been evincing steadily deteriorating standards of understanding.
The on-going war is a case in point. Ever since it became clear that Putin’s 2022 blitzkrieg had failed, and the war had entered an attrition phase, hardly a day has gone by without some expert sounding the death knell for Russia.
Russia is losing too many soldiers. The country’s economy is on the verge of collapse. Russia has no more soldiers. Her economy has collapsed already. Western sanctions are a noose throttling Russia. Putin will sue for peace at any moment now. Putin is suffering from a fatal illness and, when he dies, his successors will beat a retreat. The Russian people will rise in revolt. The war will end in a month [three months, a year, two years at the outside, take your pick].
This reminds me that only a short word separates a Mr Know-All from a Mr Know-Sod-All. Actually, when it comes to predicting when and how the war will end, I myself fall into the second category. Hard as I’m rubbing my crystal ball, it still remains too murky for me to predict the future.
However, I do know that most Western observers, even those few in command of the relevant facts, base their prophesies on false criteria. They may know much, but they understand little.
It’s a natural human trait, and a generally sound cognitive practice, to use what we know to understand what we don’t know. Alas, most of what Western observers know doesn’t apply to Russia, and neither do sound cognitive practices.
What we know about war economy is that a country has to be solvent to afford that luxury. And by our standards, Russia’s economy lies in ruins.
Because of Western sanctions, Russia has to sell her oil at or even below cost just to keep afloat. Gazprom, the jewel in Russia’s economic crown, has been reduced to a skeleton of its former self – in any Western economy it would have ceased trading long ago. Inflation is rampant, interest rates are sky-high, budget deficits are astronomical, the rouble is dying a quick death, the cost of living is outpacing inflation on its race to the moon, any other than military production has ground to a halt, imports of even staples have ceased, growth is negligible – and so forth.
All true. But do let’s consider the situation in the same country in the run-up to another war, which for Russia lasted exactly as long as the present one: the Second World (what the Russians call ‘Great Patriotic’) War.
Throughout the 1930s, the economy was being switched into a war mode. That wasn’t so much a case of guns before butter as guns and no butter – guns before everything people needed to survive. War factories were running round the clock in three daily shifts – Nazi Germany ambled along at one shift a day at the time (the Nazi economy didn’t go into a full war mode until 1942, three years after the war started).
The Soviet Union suffered a series of murderous famines. Only the ones in the Ukraine and Kazakhstan that killed millions and were deliberately organised as a crowd-control tactic have received wide publicity in the West, but there were many others as well.
The Russians lived in conditions that any Western cattle farmer would have considered unacceptable for his livestock. Compared to those Russians, their descendants today, even after four years of war, live in the lap of luxury.
Stalin’s tyranny was such that Putin’s regime looks like the acme of weak-kneed liberalism by comparison. Just a few thousand political prisoners, a mere couple of dozen dissidents bumped off? Stalin would have regarded such numbers as amateur hour.
In his Russia millions were shot with or without trial, tens of millions of others revived the notion of slavery by being thrown into death camps, where they died while mining minerals and felling trees on a bowl of liquid soup a day and in Arctic frosts.
Most Western visitors ignored the tyranny, or even welcomed it as a bold experiment, but even they couldn’t fail to notice the empty shelves in grocery shops and mile-long queues for bread. What they also failed to notice was that Stalin was creating the world’s most formidable war machine, a juggernaut ready to roll over Europe.
So it would have done had Hitler not beaten Stalin to the punch by starting the war on his terms. The tyrannised, impoverished Red soldiers, most of whom had had family members killed or imprisoned by the NKVD, didn’t want to fight for Stalin. They surrendered en masse, with the Germans taking over four million POWs in the first few months (my father among them). That was a popular uprising in all but name.
The war started on 22 June, 1941, and by late November German officers could see the Kremlin through their field glasses. Every sensible Western observer knew the war was about to end – in Moscow. Instead it lasted another four years and ended in Berlin.
Now let me ask you this. Suppose the US and Britain went to war with, say, China and won, but having lost 40 million and 14 million respectively. How do you think the subsequent generations, including historians, would view that war?
Would they treat it as a resounding triumph vindicating the greatness of the people and their leaders or as the worst tragedy and the greatest national shame ever? Yet the numbers cited represent exactly the proportion of the population the Soviet Union lost in 1941-1945. And the war is still hailed as the highlight of Russian history, the cornerstone of national ideology and identity.
The standards of civilised society don’t apply to the Russians because they aren’t civilised. They are prepared to accept the kind of deprivation and death that would be unacceptable to any Western nation. Here’s an example from history, cited by Dwight Eisenhower, who at the time was the supreme commander of Allied forces in Europe.
He was talking to Marshal Zhukov at the Yalta Conference, some three months before the end of the war. It was decided the Russians would have the honour of taking Berlin, but Eisenhower commiserated with the difficulty of getting armour through the minefields surrounding the German capital.
Zhukov couldn’t understand what Ike was on about. The way we handle this problem, he explained, is just marching some infantry units over the minefields, thereby clearing the way for tanks. Eisenhower shuddered, perhaps imagining the firing squad any Western commander would face if he used the same trick.
(On a different subject, it was at Yalta that Zhukov asked Eisenhower on Stalin’s behalf to bomb Dresden and Leipzig. Both cities had vital railway junctions through which the Germans were sending reinforcements to Berlin, making the Soviet task so much harder. So the bombing wasn’t just a useless act of Anglo-American barbarism, as some (most?) historians would have us believe.)
The upshot of it is that the on-going war will end sooner or later – wars always do. It may end in a week, next month or in three years, and I wouldn’t venture a guess when or how. But it won’t end because the Russians lose too many people and don’t eat regularly enough.
They’ve so far lost only about one per cent of the population – they still have 99 per cent left. And the people aren’t really starving yet, not by the standards of the 1930s or indeed those of my childhood. Let’s wait and see, shall we?








