
The best way of hurting Putin would be for the West to take a more direct part in arming and supporting the Ukraine. That would entail either sending troops out there or, barring that, giving the Ukraine all the tools to do the job.
But let’s be serious here, now that’s it’s just us boys. That’s not going to happen, is it? You know it, I know it – more important, Putin knows it.
The hope that Russia will eventually bleed out in the on-going war of attrition is only marginally more realistic. Blood is one thing that’s always in ample supply in Russia. The country lost 27 million people in the Second World War and still didn’t exsanguinate.
A human life is worth next to nothing there, which the rulers assert with cynicism and the masses accept with fatalism. If the Russians have lost about 1.5 million people since 2022, it’ll take another 20 years at the same casualty rate for anyone there to worry.
Sanctions? There Russia resembles a boxer who smiles at his opponent after being rocked with a hard blow. Russia too pretends she isn’t hurt by the sanctions imposed by the West, but she is.
Yet she still remains upright, able to go on fighting. The only sanctions that really sting are those that limit the flow of high-tech products into Russia, especially those vital to armament production. Sanctions on Russian hydrocarbon exports are painful too, but countries like China, India and some EU members provide helpful analgesics by buying Russian oil and gas at dumping prices.
Commentators who insist that the Russian economy is tottering ought to descend from the ivory tower of Western economic criteria. Yes, the inflation rate is high there, the people’s living standards are rapidly going down, some staples including petrol are in short supply, the average monthly salary outside Moscow is around £200 – and millions don’t even get that.
Should a similar situation arise in Europe, Frenchmen, Spaniards and perhaps even Britons would be building barricades, torching cars and attacking politicians. But Russia isn’t like France, Spain or even Britain.
Her rulers don’t care about the plight of the people and never have. And the people are either too docile, too brainwashed or too scared to do anything about it.
No money, no jobs, no prospects? Not a problem. Young men, egged on by their mothers and wives, seek income opportunities by enlisting to kill Ukrainians or, more likely, to be killed by them. The mothers and wives don’t mind either way: wages are high on the frontline, while death benefits make their loved ones even more valuable dead than alive.
So how can the West really hurt Putin, perhaps enough to force him into acting less aggressively? I have an answer, or rather 300 billion answers. That’s how many Russian dollars are currently frozen in the West.
These assets shouldn’t be frozen or impounded. They should be punitively confiscated and used as military aid for the Ukraine.
When this idea is floated from time to time, politicians, lawyers and bankers wince and throw up their hands in horror. Confiscating privately owned assets smacks of illegality, which isn’t a nice thing at all. We don’t do that sort of thing.
Such concerns shouldn’t be dismissed lightly. If civilised countries stop being ruled by law, they stop being civilised. Fine legal points matter, especially these days, when legality often replaces and sometimes contradicts morality.
But what if all legal obstacles in the way of confiscation were removed? What if it could be shown that taking that money isn’t only moral but also legal? This is what I propose to do, step by step.
The first step is to state that the Russian economy defies all the categories used by political scientists and economists. It’s not capitalist, socialist or corporatist because the sui generis Russian state is none of those things.
Russia is ruled by an organised crime group (OCG) formed by a fusion between assorted mafias and the secret police, KGB/FSB. No major country has ever had such a government, which makes null and void all the criteria, standards and terminology used to classify other economies.
One such defunct term is ‘privately owned assets’. This term has some validity in Russia only at the lower economic tiers, at the level of personal savings or income from a corner shop, a small one.
Any assets reaching millions and especially billions can be owned by private individuals only nominally. In reality, they belong to the OCG, which has total control of the money. Like any other mafia, it’s set up as a pyramid, with the godfather, in this case Putin, sitting at the very top.
Most major wealth in Russia derives from businesses linked to either natural resources, finance or infrastructure. As we climb up the steps of the aforementioned pyramid, we’ll find that ultimately and in effect they all belong to Putin.
All such businesses without exception have got rich by methods that would have produced multiple criminal convictions in any civilised country. By our standards, every Russian ‘oligarch’ is a felon – but he isn’t really an oligarch.
That term describes a man whose financial virility buys him political power. That’s not the case in any OCG and it’s certainly not the case in Russia. Power in Russia belongs to Putin, and he exerts it through intermediaries. The latter have influence for only as long as Putin lets them have it.
The same goes for their wealth. Russian ‘oligarchs’ don’t really own the capital currently in their possession. They are simply money launderers, frontmen given the task to legitimise the money by passing it as their own.
Their role is especially important because a great deal of those assets are invested in the West, impervious to the vagaries of fickle Russian politics. The nominal owners of that capital are people close to Putin, his accomplices in every crime committed by Russia, including her pouncing on her neighbours.
Some of them become Western citizens, like Leonard Blavatnik. Others may even ascend to the upper House of Parliament, as Lord Lebedev will testify. And they all live high on the hog off Putin’s money.
That means they are allowed to use some of it, calling it their own. Their cut varies depending on their proximity to Putin and their status in the OCG. According to experts, the range runs from 10 to 25 per cent, but never higher than that.
All these frontmen use some of their ill-gotten lucre to buy Western politicians, judges and journalists retail and wholesale. Such efforts differ in scale but not in kind from the usual mafia practices everywhere. There is a salient difference though.
Most of the Putin frontmen who hold his assets in Western institutions are under personal sanctions. They aren’t allowed to travel to the West and, if already living here, are denied access to their assets, other than paltry amounts (by their standards) they need for basic living expenses.
Those who manage to buy or trick their way around the personal sanctions use the money to fund the war in the Ukraine whenever Putin tells them to do so, and in the amount Putin specifies. The money belongs to him after all.
Some of those ‘oligarchs’ occasionally fall out with Putin and then, as a rule, out of the window. This pattern is familiar to anyone who has watched The Godfather and its sequels.
It’s important to realise that those personal sanctions would be instantly removed if the ‘oligarchs’ publicly severed all ties with Putin’s OCG, denounced the criminal war in the Ukraine, left Russia if still living there and refused to fund the Russian war effort. However, the Russian version of omertà, reinforced by the certainty of retribution, doesn’t allow them to do that.
When I refer to Putin’s war on the Ukraine as ‘criminal’, this isn’t just a figure of speech. On 17 March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) found Russia guilty of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, and issued arrest warrants for Putin and his closest associates.
The upshot of all this is that the $300 billion sitting in Western banks (a number that doesn’t include vast property holdings, many at some of the best London addresses) is money acquired by criminal means and used to perpetrate further crimes, on an increasingly greater scale. Practically all of it belongs not to private individuals but to the OCG run out of the Kremlin – and ultimately to its boss, Putin.
Every Western country has a law allowing confiscation under such circumstances. This is what British jurisprudence says: “The primary British law allowing the confiscation of criminally acquired assets is the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA). POCA provides powers for criminal confiscation… The Act’s goal is to deny criminals the use of their assets, and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) has a specialised unit to handle asset recovery”.
I say let’s get that specialised unit busy. Considering that a good chunk of the OCG’s assets are held in Britain, it’ll have its work cut out for it.








